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"Medical malpractice" denotes the basis for a civil action brought
by a patient against a physician for injuries resulting from negligence.
The current method for compensating victims of these occurrences is
primarily a fault-and-liability insurance system.1 The first principle of
tort liability is that the party at fault pays for the damage inflicted upon
an innocent victim. Whether a doctor is at fault is determined in an
adversary proceeding, with both the doctor and the patient represented
by counsel. The triers of fact have the task of ascertaining whether
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THE FOLLOWING CITATION WILL BE USED IN THIS ARTICLE:
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COm-

MISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (1973) [hereinafter cited as MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
REPORT].

1. See generally Keeton, Compensation for Medical Accidents, 121 U. PA. L. REv.
590 (1973). This system has been severely criticized by advocates of the "no-fault" insurance concept. See J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY (1975); Dornette, Medical Injury Insurance-A Possible Remedy for the Malpractice Problem, 78 CASE &
COMMENT 25 (Sept.-Oct. 1973); Dornette, Medical Injury Insurance-ProposedModel
Legislation, J. LEGAL MED. 24 (Mar. 1975); Havighurst & Tancredi, "Medical Adversity
Insurance"-A No-Fault Approach to Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 613
INS. L.J. 69 (1974); O'Connell, Elective No-Fault Liability Insurance for All Kinds of
Accidents: A Proposal, 608 INS. L.J. 495 (1973); O'Connell, The Best Way to Adapt
No Fault Insurance to Malpractice,MED. ECON., June 23, 1975, at 106; O'Connell, Proposed: "No-Fault" Insurance to Stem Malpractice Suits, PRIsM 12 (July 1974);
O'Connell, Elective No-Fault Liability By Contract-With or Without an Enabling Statute, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 59. See also Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence and Accidents, 84
YALE L.J. 656 (1975).
However, many influential groups, such as the American Hospital Association and
the Massachusetts Bar Association, oppose the concept of no-fault malpractice insurance.
11 HosP. WEEK, Apr. 11, 1975, at 1; Kickham, President'sMessage, 15 MASS. B. Ass'N
NEWS LETTER 2 (Apr. 1975).
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the defendant was at fault, and if so, what compensation he must pay
for the injury. The formula for determining whether the physician
is liable to the patient is commonly phrased in -terms of his failure
either to "possess the degree of professional learning, skill and ability

which others similarly situated ordinarily possess," or to "exercise
reasonable care and diligence in the application of his knowledge and
'2
skill -to the patients case."

Medical malpractice litigation is not new. The first recorded case
occurred in England in the thirteenth century, and one of the earliest
suits in the United States took place in 1794.1 By 1845, physicians had
indicated their alarm at the increase in such claims.4 Alternatives to
the jury trial were recommended, mainly by doctors.

The Massachu-

setts Medical Society suggested having a disinterested physician adjudicate malpractice claims by patients.5 In 1872, the American Medical

Association recommended that in medical malpractice cases which required expert testimony, physicians be appointed independent arbiters
by the judge.6

Yet, in spite of this traditional concern over the tort liability system by the medical profession, there was no medical malpractice "crisis" as we know it until well into the 1970s. 7 Sickness was accepted
by most people as a common occurrence. Medicine was a limited science and adverse results were often regarded as the expected outcome.
Since World War 1[ the number of malpractice suits, in absolute
numbers, has increased steadily.'

Even today, however, though the

2. Medical Malpractice: A Considerationof the Problem, 27 HEALTH L. BULL. 1
(Nov. 1971).
3. Cross v. Guthrey, 2 Root 90 (Conn. 1794). See Gussow, Answers Can and
Must Be Found To the Malpractice Situation, J.LEGAL MED. 20 (Mar. 1975).
4. Bums, Malpractice Suits in American Medicine Before the Civil War, 43 BULL.
HisT. MED. 41, 52 (1969). There are no reliable statistics for the total number of medical malpractice actions initiated before the Civil War. Yet an early commentator stated
that "legal prosecutions for malpractice in surgery occur so often that even a respectable
surgeon may well fear for the results of his surgical practice." J. ELWELL, A MEDICOLEGAL TREATISE ON MALPRACTICE AND MEDICAL EVIDENCE, COMPRISING THE ELEMENTS

Indeed, it was believed that some practitioners
were stopping their surgical practices because of the threat of malpractice. Id.
5. D. KONOLD, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN MEDICAL ETHICS: 1847-1912, at 50-51
(1962).
6. Id.
7. By "crisis" we mean the inability of physicians to purchase malpractice insurance at reasonable premiums, and, in rare cases, the inability to purchase such insurance
at any price. In the past, many doctors did not even bother to buy malpractice insurance, even though rates were low. Gussow, supranote 3.
8. For recent figures, see Malpractice in Focus: The Problem . . . And Some
Solutions 11, 12-13 (AMA source document prepared by editors of Prism, Aug. 1975).
OF MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 82 (1866).
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medical malpractice situation in the United States is generally considered to be a critical problem, most physicians still go through their entire professional lives without being sued, and those who are sued, are
rarely sued more than once. 9 The majority of hospitals, regardless of
Many factors led to this increase. More people could afford to receive medical care
and, therefore, the number of opportunities for something to happen which would lead
to a malpractice claim increased. See Malpractice Insurance Plagues Numerous Physicians, Hospitals, 4 WASHINrGTON DEVELOPMENTS 1, 4 (Jan. 31, 1975). Most other
factors directly involve the rise of the hospital as the center of complex health care delivery. Medical technology became increasingly complex and sophisticated. Porter,
Consumer Is Making Demands As Malpractice Crisis Grows, Boston Herald American,
May 28, 1975, at 14, col. 4. William Curran, professor of legal medicine at Harvard
University, feels that most malpractice cases are the result of the inherent risks of modem medicine with its rapidly developing techniques. Malpractice: MD's Revolt, NEwsThe general practitioner was replaced by the specialist,
WEEK, June 9, 1975, at 63.
teams of physicians, and medical institutions. Auerbach, Specializing Intensifies Malpractice Rate Issue, Washington Post, May 12, 1975, at A2, col. 3. The center of much
medical practice moved from the office and home to the clinic and hospital. Altman,
The Complexities of Medical Practice and Malpractice, N.Y. Times, June 5, 1975, at
28, col. 4. This resulted in more impersonal care and a deterioration of the intimate
doctor-patient relationship, thereby creating further misunderstanding and disharmony.
Malpractice Cooperation Urged, 3 HEALTH LAWYvRS NEWS REP. 1 (Apr. 1975). See
also Neeson, Mysticism Lost, 232 J.A.M.A. 374 (1975); Ribicoff, Medical Malpractice: The Patient vs. The Physician, TluAL 11 (Feb./Mar. 1970):
When the patient-physician "rapport" remains on a high level of competence
and trust, most patients will ride out a bad result through much pain and
suffering and expense without resort to a malpractice lawsuit. But when that
"rapport" is inadequate in the beginning, and is permitted to deteriorate en
route, a malpractice suit is likely to follow.
Most of the larger awards made in medical malpractice cases have been against hospitals. See, e.g., Niles v. San Rafael, Civil No. 624,337 (San Francisco Super. Ct., Feb.
5, 1973); Miadema v. Glendora Hosp., Civil No. - (Los Angeles Super. Ct., June 4,
1973); Steams v. Park Ave. Hosp., Inc., Civil No. - (Pomona Super. Ct., May 1,
1973).
Simultaneously with these changes in the practice of medicine came a growing consumer movement in society. Fellers, When Lawyers and Doctors Clash, 2 BARuSTaR
8 (Summer 1975). The trend was for the public to seek compensation for all injuries,
resulting in an increase in personal injury litigation. More lawyers entered the malpractice litigation field, making the retention of competent plaintiff's counsel easier. Waxman, Spiraling Costs: A Health Care Slide, TRIAL 23, 24 (May/June 1975). Finally,
the interest of the media in medicine and its advances not only added to the public's
knowledge, but often led to unrealistic expectations of a physician's ability. This has
often been referred to as the "Marcus Welby syndrome." Altman, Doctors Told Unrealistic Hopes Add to the Malpractice Crisis,N.Y. Times, June 16, 1975, at 12, col. 4.
While currently available statistics are inadequate to determine for certain, it is entirely possible that the actual incidence of medical malpractice cases, in terms of doctorpatient and hospital-patient contacts, has remained relatively constant over the past two
decades.
9. In 1970, medical malpractice claims were made for only one out of every
226,000 patient visits to doctors. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPoRT 12. Although exact
figures for 1975 are not presently available, even making the unlikely assumption that
the incidence of claims has more than doubled, it would still be only one out of every
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size, go through an entire year without having a single claim filed
against them. 10 Jury trials of these claims are also unusual, with fewer
than one trial held for every ten claims resolved," and eighty percent
of all jury verdicts are in favor of the physician-defendant. 12
Nevertheless, the fear of being sued permeates the medical community, and has an impact on almost every facet of the system. It affects health care practices and forms of medical treatment, the distribution of health manpower, the modes of processing claims through the
legal system, and the attitudes of the public toward the delivery of
health care and toward the doctor-patient relationship in particular.' 3
The main component is an insurance crisis in which, as in the automobile insurance controversy, the availability and cost of medical malpractice insurance is in a state of turmoil. 14
100,000 patient visits. In 1974, malpractice actions were pending against one out of
every ten physicians. Malpractice In Focus, supra note 8, at 13.
10. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT 9, 12.
11. Rudov, Myers & Mirabella, Medical MalpracticeInsurance Claims Files Closed
in 1970, in MEDICAL MALPRACncE REPORT Appendix 1, 13.
12. See Auerbach, Malpractice: The Doctor's Dilemma, Washington Post, May 18,
1975, at C3, col. 6. Most patients who are injured by malpractice never receive any
compensation for their injury. Cerra, Malpractice Claims: Many Are Filed, But Few
Are Paid, N.Y. Times, June 1, 1975, § 1, at 46, col. 4. There are many times more
medical injuries than there are claims. Auerbach, supra, at C3, col. 2. Some estimates
put the number of significant injuries from medical malpractice at 750,000 annually.
Medical Self-Regulation and Malpractice,293 NEw ENG. J. MED. 562 (1975). The patient is more likely to sue if his injury is severe and he has no other sources of financial
assistance. MEDICAL MALPRAcIcE REPORT 25. Because of the complex medical issues
involved and court backlog, lawsuits last between two and six years, or two to three
times longer than other personal injury cases. Id. at 10-11. During this extended period
the injured party receives no money and yet is least able to bear the cost of his medical
and rehabilitation bills.
13. See Bird, Three Views on Malpractice: Doctor, Lawyer, Patient, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 23, 1975, at 47, col. 7.
14. Estimates of the rise in the cost of malpractice insurance premiums in recent
years have varied between 50 and 1,000 percent.

MEDICAL MALPRACICE REPORT 8-14.

In 1960, the Secretary's Medical Malpractice Commission estimated the cost of professional liability coverage at $60 million. Insurance industry estimates, which are usually
conservative, suggest a total premium paid in 1975 of well over $1 billion. Between
1960 and 1970, malpractice insurance premium volume for dentists rose 115.7 percent;
for hospitals, 262 percent; for physicians other than surgeons, 540.8 percent; and for surgeons, 949.2 percent. Malpractice in Focus, supra note 8, at 20.
Other figures are equally revealing. A New York obstetrician had to pay $9,433
in 1974 to keep himself adequately covered against lawsuits. A specialist in a high-risk
field like neurosurgery had to pay $14,329. Suing the Doctor, TIME, July 15, 1974, at
78. Some physicians have at times found it difficult to purchase any insurance, with
a number of insurance companies leaving the medical malpractice business altogether.
Malpractice CarrierSails Away, MED. WORLD NEws, Mar. 24, 1975, at 23; Hendricks,
What Your Next Malpractice Policy May Look Like, MED. EcoN., Apr. 14, 1975, at
29; A.M.A. Moves to Enter the Insurance Field in the MalpracticeBattle, N.Y. Times,
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Numerous critics place much of the blame for this situation on the
tort liability system and recommend its abolition.1 5 Because of the tort

system's current unpopularity, the impending passage of some form of
national health insurance may be used as an excuse to eliminate it in

medical cases. In an attempt to determine the effects of such a policy,
this Article will examine the workability of the traditional tort liability
system to demonstrate that the aforementioned problems are not inher-

ent to the system, but merely are the result of its current mode of application. Accordingly, the use or discontinuance of the tort system un-

der national health insurance should rest not on hollow slogans, but on
a careful examination of the system's coverage, cost, quality control,
and consumer responsiveness.
I.

THE TORT LiABiLITY SYSTEM

Many aspects of the tort liability system have been attacked as
contributing to the malpractice crisis. Res ipsa loquitur, informed consent, statutes of limitations, ad damnum clauses, damages for pain and
suffering, unlimited damages, and the contingent fee system have been
the primary targets. It will be demonstrated in this section that none
of these characteristics accounts for the current malpractice "crisis-they are only lightning rods in the storm of controversy surrounding
this issue.
June 20, 1975, at 33, col. 4; Teledyne Says It Erred in Letting Unit Cover Medical Malpractice, Wall Street J., Feb. 19, 1975, at 19, col. 1-2.
Hospitals have experienced a similar increase. For example, annual malpractice
premiums for Long Branch Memorial Hospital in California rose from $12,000 in 1965
to $820,000 in 1975. Malpractice Insurance Plagues Numerous Physicians, Hospitals,
supra note 8, at 4. In 1969, Massachusetts General Hospital paid $120,000 for malpractice coverage. In the past year alone, the cost has risen from $300,000 to $1,200,000
for the same coverage. Comments of Dr. Thomas S. Durant, Assistant Director, Massachusetts General Hospital, at Conference, The Great Medical Malpractice Crisis of
1975, Harvard School of Public Health, May 1, 1975. According to the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare, hospitals pay about two-thirds of the $1 billion annual cost of malpractice insurance premiums. The cost of this insurance is necessarily
passed on through fees and charges and is ultimately paid by the patient. Approximately fifty cents of the daily cost for every patient in the average hospital is for the
hospital's malpractice insurance. But in California, premiums paid represent a $4.65 additional charge per hospital bed every day. Malpractice Insurance Plagues Numerous
Physicians, Hospitals, supra note 8, at 1. Hospitals in Massachusetts may be forced to
increase their room rates by eight to ten dollars per day in order to pay for increased
cost of malpractice insurance. Malpractice Crisis Stirs Concern, Boston Herald American, Apr. 7, 1975, at 3, col. 2.
15. A complete examination of the concept of "fault" in civil litigation is beyond
the scope of this work and has been dealt with in detail in numerous other articles. See
note 1 supra.
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Res ipsa is invoked under special circumstances to shift the burden of persuasion in a case from the plaintiff to the defendant. Three
conditions must exist for the application of res ipsa. First, an injury of
the kind which usually does not occur in the absence of negligence
must have taken place. Second, the conduct or mechanism causing the
injury must have been under the exclusive control of the defendant(s).
Lastly, the plaintiff must have been free of any contributory negligence.'16 A typical case is a sponge left inside the patient after surgery.
With the growing availability of discovery methods, however, res ipsa
loses much of its importance and can be viewed merely as a general
rule of circumstantial evidence. Indeed, recent statistics show that it
plays a part in fewer than fifteen percent of all medical malpractice
17
cases that reach the appellate level.
The doctrine of informed consent has also received much criticism
from the medical community.18 This concept, which has its roots in
late nineteenth and early twentieth century battery cases, simply states
that before a patient is asked to consent to a treatment, procedure, or
operation, the physician should be required to make certain disclosures.
These disclosures include risks of death or serious disability, alternative
treatments, consequences of not undergoing any treatment, problems
of recuperation, and success rates. The medical arguments against this
doctrine are essentially three: (1) this information will unduly frighten
patients; (2) patients will not understand this information or it will take
too long to explain in a way they can understand; and (3) this doctrine
permits patients to sue physicians in the absence of any negligence in
the performance of the treatment, procedure, or operation. Physicians
have reacted vehemently to recent cases basing the amount of information that must be disclosed on a legal rather than a medical community
practice standard, and have urged in a number of states, such as New
York, the enactment of legislation specifically designed to radically curtail the use of this doctrine in a malpractice action.' 9
All of the evidence, however, seems to point to the fact that a
well-informed patient is the least likely to sue his physician, and that
curtailment of information disclosure is likely to lead to unrealistic ex16. W. PROSSER, HANDBooK OF ".pELAW OF TORTS 214 (4th ed. 1971).
17. Dietz, Baird & Berul, The Medical Malpractice Legal System, in MEDICAL MALPrAcTICE REPORT Appendix 87, 128.
18. The concept was roundly condemned by former A.M.A. President Charles Hoffman in his dissent in the Secretary's Malpractice Report. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPrT 122.
19. N.Y. Pun. HEALTH LAw § 2805-d (McKinney Supp. 1975). See Trout, New
York State MalpracticeLegislation, I. LEGAL MED. 26 (July/Aug. 1975).
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pectations followed by suits alleging malpractice in the presence of a
less than expected result.2 0 Thus, the elimination or weakening of this

doctrine, while it will remove the few suits founded primarily on this
cause of action, 2 is likely to increase significantly patient distrust of
physicians and therefore malpractice actions in general. Moreover, the
doctrine that patients, not physicians, should have the ultimate decision
regarding specific therapies is so important to both self-autonomy and

rational decision making that no erosion of it should be permitted. Exceptions relating to emergencies and cases where the physician can
document serious adverse patient effects resulting from full disclosure
should be strictly limited to prevent them from engulfing the rule of
routine full disclosure.
Although each state establishes its own statute of limitations, the
usual maximum permissible interval for initiating tort suits is within two
years of the date of the tortious act.22 An extension is sometimes

granted for medical malpractice actions when the act of negligence is
not apparent or is concealed by the negligent doctor, the most common

exception being for foreign objects left within the patient's body after
an operation.2 3 In such cases the statute of limitations begins to run
when the patient knew or had reason to know of the injury or negligent
act.24 For minors the statute of limitations for medical negligence is
usually tolled until the individual attains the age of twenty-one, or
eighteen in appropriate states.2 5 This extended capacity for minors
has been the central target of attacks on the statutes, 26 although a
shortening of the two-year limit has been proposed as well.2T
20. Annas, Avoiding MalpracticeSuits Through the Use of Informed Consent, CuRRENT PROBLEMS iN PEDIATRICS

(to be published Mar. 1976).

21. Probably less than ten percent of the suits fall within this category. Dietz,
Baird & Berul, supra note 17.
22. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW & RuLES § 203 (f) (McKinney 1972).
23. See Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 248 N.E.2d 871, 301
N.Y.S.2d 23 (1969); N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. LAw & RULE § 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1975).
24. "[W]here a foreign object is left in a patient's body during the course of
a surgical operation, the period of limitations begins to run when the patient knows or
had reason to know about the foreign object and the existence of the cause of action
based upon its presence." Tramutola v. Bortone, 118 N.J. Super. 503, 513, 288 A.2d
863, 868 (1972), rev'd in part on other grounds and modified in part on other grounds,
63 NJ. 9, 304 A.2d 197 (1973). In medical malpractice cases, the statute of limitations
commences to run "from the time of discovery of a right of action," that is "when the
patient knows or should know that he has suffered injury or damage." Waldman v.
Rohrbaugh, 241 Md. 137, 145, 215 A.2d 825, 830 (1969).
25. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. ch. 2A, § 14-21 (1952). Cf. IND. ANN. STAT. § 169.5-3-1 (Bums 1975), which limits infancy disability to age six, at which time the twoyear statute of limitations for tort actions begins to run.
26. See Welch, Medical Malpractice,292 NEw ENG. J. MmD. 1372, 1376 (1975).
27. A number of states have already altered the law to begin the statute of limita-
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The reasons for placing a time limit on the period during which suit
may be filed are twofold: first, to prevent victims from suing alleged
wrongdoers long after memories and details have become obscured, or
medical records lost, and second, to allow persons to reconstitute their
lives and escape the ever-impending threat of a lawsuit. 28 In addition,
statutes of limitations aid insurance companies in predicting the extent
of their losses for any period so that they can adjust premiums to cover
payouts. 2 The application of statutes of limitations in malpractice
cases, and particularly the tolled statute for minors, is often blamed for
the high insurance rates which must be charged to cover the contingency of delayed losses.8 0
tions with occurrence of the incident. Several, including Indiana, Texas, and Michigan,
have fixed the deadline at two years after the act for most claims. See note 25 supra.
California is considering a change to three years after occurrence, Florida has established the deadline at four years, and Maryland and Illinois, among others, have set the
cutoff at five years. Hendricks, Your Malpractice Protection, MED. ECON., Sept. 29,
1975, at 105, 1.10. The American Medical Association has suggested the following:
Insofar as they are suspended during minority or until the injury is actually
discovered the statutes should be rectified to the extent necessary to reduce the
"long-tail" problem. Therefore, no action for damages for personal injury
whether based on tort or breach of contract, should be brought against any
provider of medical care, unless
(1)The action is commenced within two years after the date on which the act
or omission occurred (exposure) which is alleged to have caused the injury, or
(2) Thereafter within six months of the date on which the person injured or
the claimant knew or reasonably should have known (discovery) of the existence of such personal injury, but
(3) In no event shall any such action for damages be commenced more than
five years from the date on which occurred the act or omission which is alleged
to have been the cause of the injury. Fellers, supranote 8, at 71-72.
28. Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 386, 390 (1868); W.
PaossER, supra note 16, at 144.

29. Golladay & Smith, Who Shall Pay? An Analysis of the Malpractice Crisis, 6
RESEARCH & ANALYTIC RESEARCH SERIFs 3 (Center for Medical Sociology and Health

Services Research, Health Economics Research Center, University of Wisconsin 1975).
As one insurance official stated, "If you can't determine rates based on your losses--and its nearly impossible in malpractice insurance-then you don't belong in the business." Ribicoff, supra note 8, at 13.
30. A limitation of twenty-three years of age for minors may seem arbitrary. Such
a lengthy time span during which a suit can be brought inevitably invites the chance
that the medical treatment of a child will be judged by the more advanced standards
existing when suit is brought, regardless of the judicial cognizance and admonition to
the jury of the time factor. Yet before a shorter period is selected, inquiry should be
made as to whether there are any circumstances which would cause the negligent treatment of a child to be less likely to manifest itself than negligent care of an adult. For
example, limitations on a child's ability to communicate effectively might suggest that
a two year statute of limitations should not begin to run until children are old enough
to understand their bodies and communicate a problem. However, ability to communicate appears too subjective a standard for establishment of a uniform age. A more relevant difference between children and adults is physical development. Using this criterion, a two year limitation period would not begin to run for children until the child's
skeletal growth stopped (e.g., age thirteen in girls, age fifteen in boys, or age fourteen

Vol. 1975:13351

NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE

1343

A statute of limitations of two years does not appear to produce
unwarranted claims and does not seem unduly lengthy in light of the
above policies. In fact, a shorter limitations period might induce many
claims to be made-which would not have been substantiated after a
lengthier lapse of time and investigation-in order to protect against

the contingency that later pain or slow recovery was discovered to be
due to negligent care.
Elimination of ad damnum clauses, the estimate made by the
plaintiff in his complaint as to the amount of damages he has suffered,

has been proposed in many "malpractice alleviation" statutes."' These
damage requests often substantially overstate the probable range of recovery in order to emphasize both the severity of the plaintiff's injury

and to set a bargaining position. Therefore, since they may not reasonably be related to actual damages, their abolition should probably
be encouraged. 2

Placing some limitations on damages for pain and

suffering, a subjective injury which requires some speculation by the
jury, might also be warranted.38
A ceiling on the amount of total damages which can be awarded

in a particular case has also been proposed in numerous malpractice
alleviation statutes.

For example, an Indiana statute has limited per-

sonal liability for each individual physician to $100,000, and total damages for the entire suit to $500,000, with any damages exceeding

$100,000 to be paid from a reinsurance pool funded by premiums from
all insurance carriers in the state. 34 Such a ceiling might help to contain costs, but only at the expense of seriously injured patients. 5 Of

course, with national health insurance paying all or at least the most
as a compromise). A skeletal growth limitation would be objective and it appears to
correlate well with full manifestation of any negligent treatment upon minors.
31. Welch, supra note 26, at 1374. E.g., IND. ANN. STAT. § 16-9.5-1-6 (Bums
1975) (eliminates the requirement of ad damnum clauses).
32. Dornette, Indiana Adopts MalpracticeLegislation, 3 J. LEGAL MED. 26, 27 (June
1975); Welch, supra note 26, at 1347. Abolition was also recommended by the Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT 38.
33. It should be noted that this criticism of damage awards for pain and suffering
is applicable to the entire tort liability system, and is not limited to medical malpractice
cases.
34. IND. ANN. STAT. § 16-9.5-2-2 (Burns 1975). See New Indiana Law Will Cut
Negligence Suits, Improve Care, 17 PHYsiciAN's LEGAL BRIEF 1 (Fall 1975).
35. Another suggested way for relieving the financial burden on defendants of damage awards is to permit collateral sources of compensation to be used to mitigate the
amount of the damages awarded. These include continuing sources of income, health
and accident insurance, social security benefits, workmen's compensation, disability insurance, and the income tax treatment given the monetary award. See Hirsch, Malpractice Crisis: Fact or Fiction, 80 CASE & COMMENT 3, 4 (July/Aug. 1975).
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expensive medical bills, as will be discussed later, 36 the problem of suing in order to meet large medical bills will be eliminated.
Few lawyers handle medical malpractice cases on anything other
than a contingent fee basis. 3 7 This payment system is often cited as
contributing to the rise in malpractice claims.38 Such a belief is contrary to both the theoretical and actual operation of the system.

Pa-

tients bring malpractice suits, not lawyers. Blaming the legal profession for such suits is akin to blaming the fire department for arson. 9
Contrary to encouraging the filing of malpractice suits, the contingent
fee structure actually compels lawyers to screen out claims which are
spurious or for which recovery appears less than probable, as well as

to refuse claims for which damages would not amount to a sum sufficient to reimburse their expenses. ° Since the attorney, rather than
the patient, bears the financial risk of losing the suit, -he has no incen-

tive to invest any time or money in a claim for which recovery appears
doubtful. 4 '

In addition, with the average fee rate approximately one

third of recovery, many lawyers decline malpractice cases which will
probably achieve settlements or awards of less than $10,000 because
the expected compensation for the amount of time expended is not
seen as worthwhile.4 2 The threshold value for the acceptance of cases

for which recovery is less than probable would, on the average, be
higher. Thus, although the vast majority of malpractice claims have
been found to have some merit, most are rejected by the lawyers to

whom they are brought. 43 This also means that only a small percent36. See notes 56-82 infra and accompanying text.
37. Under this system, a lawyer does not get paid for anything other than his expenses unless the suit is won, in which case he takes thirty to fifty percent of the award.
Porter, Consumer Is Making Demands as Malpractice Crisis Grows, Boston Herald
American, May 28, 1975, at 14, col. 3.
38. See Bloom, Malpractice-TheMess That Must Be Ended, 106 READER'S DiGEST
79 (Apr. 1975); Hirsch, supra note 35, at 3.
39. Annas, Don't Blame Lmvyers for the Malpractice Mess!, Am. MED. NEws,
Mar. 3, 1975, at 8.
40. See Sharpe, Contingent Fee-PhysicianProtection,TRImL 21 (Feb./Mar. 1970).
41. Id.
42. Contrary to encouraging the filing of malpractice suits, the contingent fee structure actually compels lawyers to screen out claims which are spurious or for which recovery appears less than probable, as well as to refuse claims for which damages would
not amount to a sum sufficient to reimburse their expenses. See Dietz, Baird & Berul,
supra note 17, at 113-20.
43. A recent study showed that lawyers reject twenty-three percent of malpractice
cases for economic reasons. Malpractice Cooperation Urged, supra note 8, at 2. However, another study found that a large segment of defendant and plaintiff lawyers believed the contingent fee system had little impact on an attorney's decision not to take
a malpractice case. Dietz, Baird & Berul, supra note 17, at 119.
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age of injured patients who seek legal help actually obtain it.4 4
Of course, when two malpractice claims with similar prospects of
recovery compete for an attorney's time, the contingent fee structure,
with its flat rate of reimbursement, may encourage acceptance of the
more shocking and sensational case, since it has the greater likelihood
of eliciting jury sympathy and, accordingly, a larger recovery. The
sliding scale fee structure, in which the percentage fee decreases as
the plaintiffs award increases, would eliminate the purely financial inducement to accept claims with potentially large awards and would
eliminate the potential which the contingent fee system has for wiping
out a substantial portion of the injured person's recovery. 45 However,
it should be noted that this redistribution of the recovery between the
patient-plaintiff and the attorney would affect neither the size of the
award,46 nor the volume of suits.
Considering the patient's choice of possible schemes for payment
of counsel fees, patients with large potential recoveries might prefer
a per diem rate if they were certain of recovery, but most persons
would prefer the lawyer to bear the financial risk of losing a case. In
this sense, the contingent fee system encourages the filing of more
cases by permitting the poor and lower middle class patient to seek
legal aid which he would never have been able to afford under a per
diem payment scheme. Yet, as noted above, the contingent fee probably encourages only the filing of meritorious claims by these lower income patients. In addition, the rise in the cost of malpractice suits
here is comparable to that in Great Britain, although the contingent
fee for attorneys is not employed there. 47 The contingent fee, therefore, is not a major factor in the development of the medical malpractice problem, and its elimination would do little to solve the dilemma.
The present tort system is also blamed for "defensive medicine,"
the alteration of modes of medical practice for the sole purpose of
avoiding legal liability. 4 The annual costs of such practices have been
44. See note 12 supra.
45. New Jersey was an early leader in this area. In 1971 it scaled contingency fees
so that a lawyer could collect only about $27,000 on a $100,000 award or settlement,
and no more than ten percent of amounts exceeding $100,000. See Hendricks, supra
note 27, at 113-14 (suggests limit on contingent attorney fees to fifteen percent on malpractice awards exceeding $100,000).
46. This would only be true if the jury were not instructed as to the application
of the sliding scale fee structure to the damage award.
47. Curran, The British Experience in Medical Malpractice: An Upward Trend,
288 Nnw ENG. I. MED. 249 (1973).
48. Tort Law Criticized and Defended, in MEDICAL MALPRACTImE, A DIscusSION OF
ALTERNATIVm COMPENSATION AND QUALrIrY CONTROL SYSTEMS 2, 3 (D. McDonald ed.
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estimated at from $1 to $7 billion 49-estimates that alone call the entire notion of defensive medicine into serious question. Moreover,
those studies which have been done, although all in the emergency

ward setting, indicate that based on professional standards too few,
rather than too many, diagnostic tests are being performed.50 At the
present time all that can be said is that we do not know the extent
to which "defensive medicine" is practiced,51 but we do know that much
that poses as "defensive medicine," such as appropriate expert consultations and the keeping of better medical records, is in fact improved
health care. 52 The fact that it has been imposed by the tort system is an

advantage rather than a disadvantage of the present system. Moreover,
its existence demonstrates the ability of the present tort system to

change physician behavior, something no other measure, such as continuing education or licensing examinations, has been able to accomplish.53
The present tort system may leave much to be desired, but the
major arguments against it from the physician's perspective are unimpressive. 54 Any modifications contemplated under national health insurance should aim at improving one or more of the following four
measures of success without impinging on the others: effective qual1971); Graham, Malpractice Suits Rise, Lead Doctors to Treat Patients With Caution,
Wall Street J., Jan. 8, 1971, at 1, col. 6. Under this definition all defensive medicine
is, of course, bad medical practice since it deviates from standard medical practice for
non-medical considerations. Its impact may also be the opposite of what is hoped for,
i.e. a physician may get sued for the adverse reactions from an unnecessary test or procedure he performed for "defensive" purposes.
49. Golladay & Smith, supra note 29, at 4; Regier, The View From HEW on Federal Involvement in the Malpractice Situation, J. LEGAL MED. 19 (June 1975); Wolfe,
The Real Victim, TRAmL 26, 30 (May/June 1975). See also Hassard, Change Tort
System?: Pro, MED. WoRLD NEWS, Sept. 8, 1975, at 60, 62.
50. Brook & Appel, Quality-of-Care Assessment: Choosing a Method for Peer Review, 288 Nnw ENG. J. MED. 1323 (1973); Brook & Stevenson, Effectiveness of Patient
Care in an Emergency Room, 283 NEW. ENG. J. ME. 904 (1970). These studies may
also indicate, however, that all physicians are doing too many tests in the sense that
most of the patients in these studies felt better no matter what the physicians did or
did not do to them.
51. Bemzweig, Defensive Medicine, in MEDICAL IALPRACTICE REPORT Appendix 38,
38.40. But see Defensive Medicine? Doctors Say Yes!, TRIAL 65 (Mar./Apr. 1973).
52. Project, The Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of Defensive Medicine, 1971
Dun L.J. 939.
53. Even the imposition of national standards under national health insurance holds
little promise for increased use of licensing as a means of quality control, since this
method rarely ferrets out gross incompetence.
54. The general opinion among lawyers seems to be that the tort system is preferable to any of the proposed alternatives. See Goldstein, Malpractice Claims, N.Y.
Times, June 6, 1975, at 18, col. 1; Goldstein, Doctors Called Opposed to Rights, N.Y.
Times, June 3, 1975, at 22, col. 1.
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ity control, complete patient coverage, cost effectiveness, and responsiveness to the consumer-patient. 55

I.

NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE

Assuming that some form of national health insurance will be implemented in the near future, 56 the impact of such a new fiscal and
delivery system of health services upon the health care system must
be determined before assessing the role malpractice litigation should
play. Although national health insurance is primarily aimed at financing medical care, with reduction of medical negligence only a secondary target, changes in the finance system will produce side-effects
which will definitely influence the current medical negligence prob-

lem. 57 Cost, quality, and extent and duration of service are among
the factors which will probably be affected by a national health insu-

rance program.58
The numerous national health insurance proposals, which run the
gamut from merely increasing the funding of present programs to rede55. See Annas, Medical Malpractice: Are the Doctors Right?, TMAL 59-63 (July
1974). For an overview of what the states are doing to solve the medical malpractice
problem, see Malpractice in Focus, supra note 8, at 30. One or more malpractice bills
have been enacted into law this year in twenty-eight states, a total of seventy laws. 3
STATE HEALTH LEGISLATION REPORT (Oct. 1975); Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1417.
56. It has been estimated that a national health insurance program could become
law in 1977 or 1978, but that a two-and-a-half year "tooling-up" period would be required after the law is enacted and before benefits actually begin. National Health Insurance: Reassurance From the Left, MED. ECON., June 9, 1975, at 133. At the present
time, there is a feeling among Congressional leaders that NHI must take a back seat
to anti-recession measures. NHI Prospects Recede, 3 HEALTH LAWYERS NEws REP. 1
(Feb. 1975). Yet Leonard Woodcock, President of the United Auto Workers, has predicted that NHI will become a key issue during the 1976 presidential election. The
AHA Reaffirmed Its Support for HR. 1, 11 Hosp. WEEK, Apr. 18. 1975. at 1.
57. For example, encouragement of group practice rather than individual practitioner provision of health services may further depersonalize the physician-patient relationship, resulting in less communication, less understanding and a greater willingness
to blame the provider for adversities.
58. All national health insurance bills attempt to extend health service coverage,
in terms of both population and benefits, at a tolerable cost to the consumer. The unpredictable occurrence of serious illness or injury, coupled with the prohibitively high
cost of medical treatment and care, have compelled focus on potential means for distributing the uneven and uncertain costs of health care to make it a manageable burden
for consumers.
Subsumed under the cost and extended coverage objectives in many proposed plans
are the goals of controlling the quality of medical care; increasing the supply of medical
personnel, including the development of new levels of medical personnel; improving facilities, such as the implementation of new delivery systems; and distributing resources
to underserved areas to rectify supply-demand imbalances.
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signing the fiscal and delivery mechanisms, reveal the lack of a political
and medical consensus on how best to provide universal comprehensive
health care. While it is a definite oversimplification, for our purposes 0
the three basic approaches to national health insurance can be defined
as follows: catastrophic coverage, subsidy-credit, and uniform-comprehensive. We will argue that only some form of the comprehensive approach is likely to have any impact on the way medical care is currently
delivered in this country, and consequently on any method of reimbursement for negligently-induced injuries within the health care system.
A. Catastrophic Coverage. The basic model for this type of
coverage ° provides that the entire amount of a family's medical bills
will be paid after a certain level has been reached (e.g., $1,500 annually). The purpose is simply to prevent people from having to sell
their homes and completely rearrange their lives because of a serious
illness in the family. A modification of this approach would base the
amount of the annual direct expense limit or "deductible" on the family's income. If low enough, the deductible would be zero; if high,
the deductible would be correspondingly large. 61 The advantages of
such a proposal would accrue to the poor in that the welfare-non-welfare distinction would be removed, and even low income families who
currently do not qualify for Medicaid would be covered after only a minimal deductible expenditure. While this form of insurance would
probably have the effect of increasing demand, especially for out-patient services, it is unlikely that it would have any other major impact
on the current health care system since it will in no way change the
manner in which health services are delivered, and thus the current
tort system would continue to serve the same function it presently does.
B. Subsidy-Credit Alternatives. These proposals currently out
of favor, would give either subsidies or tax credits to individuals in
order to purchase commercial health insurance. Their main purpose
59. Since the objective of this Article is to determine what role malpractice litigation
should play under national health insurance, many important aspects of the insurance
question which are irrelevant to this discussion, such as whether revenues for the various
proposals derive from payroll taxes or general revenues, will not be treated.
60. All 1975 national health insurance bills protect against catastrophic illness or
injury. However, the National Catastrophic Illness Act of 1975, H.R. 1373, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. (sponsored by Rep. Roe) and the Medical Expenses Tax Credit Act, H.R. 3328,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) (sponsored by Rep. Martin), S. 600, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1975) (sponsored by Sen. Brock) are confined to such protection.
61. For example, the deductible under the National Catastrophic Illness Act of 1975
is an amount $1,500 less than adjusted gross income except for individuals or families
with adjusted gross incomes less than $2,000. The deductible diminishes from $500 at
$2,000 of adjusted gross income to zero at $1,000 or less of income. H.R. 1373, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2015(b).
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is to replace Medicare and Medicaid and encourage all individuals to
purchase their own insurance programs. Politically the plan is unattractive since Medicaid currently provides more benefits than do commercial carriers, and the poor and middle class might not be persuaded
to purchase commercial insurance. Moreover, because these proposals
rely on current forms of health insurance, they include all of the weaknesses in the present system. They are essentially instruments to redistribute income, and should be judged as attempts at welfare reform
rather than improvements in health care insurance. In the unlikely
event that such a program is adopted, however, the present tort system
would have to be maintained since a plan of this type would merely
change the financing mechanism while leaving essentially the same system for delivering health care.
C. Uniform Comprehensive Health Insurance. The final major
category of health insurance, and the one most likely to prevail in the
future, is comprehensive coverage for the entire population. 62 The
major differences between proposals of this type involve the amount
of direct federal intervention in quality control, modes of health care
delivery, the utilization of deductibles, coinsurance premiums, and finally, the types of services which are not covered (e.g., dental, psychiatric, home health care).
Perhaps the most ambitious plan is Senator Kennedy's Health Security Act, 63 which would require no deductibles or coinsurance payments by the patient and would cover all medically necessary health
services if rendered by a qualified provider. 4 Such providers would
have to abide by certain quality control regulations, such as PSRO monitoring of services.6 5 Institutions would have to maintain utilization review procedures, as well as other standards, to assure the medical necessity of operations, a medically adequate level of treatment and care,
and the efficient use of health care facilities. 66 Individual practition62. Four "comprehensive benefits" bills were introducted in 1975:

(1) The Health

Security Act, S. 3, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (sponsored by Sen. Kennedy and AFL-CIO
Committee on National Health Insurance), H.R. 21, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (sponsored
by Rep. Corman); (2) National Comprehensive Health Benefits Act of 1975, H.R.
2050, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (sponsored by Rep. Staggers); (3) National Health Care
Services Reorganization and Financing Act, H.R. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (sponsored by
Rep. Ullman and The American Hospital Association); (4) National Health Care Act
of 1975, S. 1438, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (sponsored by Sen. McIntyre and the Health Insurance Association of America), H.R. 5990, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (sponsored by Rep.
Burleson).

63. S. 3, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), H.R. 21, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
64. Id. § 21.

65. Id. §§ 41, 141, 145.
66. Id. §§ 43, 51.
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ers would be subject to continuing education requirements.

7

Treat-

ment by a qualified specialist and, except in an emergency, referral
from a general practitioner would be prerequisites of reimbursement for
major surgery and other special operations. 8
Financial inducements, either educational loan forgiveness or income supplements, would be used to redistribute health personnel to

the underserved rural and inner city areas.69

Development of more

efficacious delivery systems would be concentrated in attempts to stim-

ulate the growth of Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs). 0
Less radical than the Health Security Act are national health insurance proposals which share the cost of benefits with the patient and

gradually adopt comprehensive coverage over a period of years.

71 Cost-

sharing and graduated coverage are attempts to limit -the demand ex72

pected from national health insurance.

67. Id. § 142.
68. Id. § 143.
69. Id. §§ 103, 105.
70. Id. §§ 103(a), 104(a). HMOs are prepaid group practice organizations which
offer comprehensive health services either through their own facilities and staff or by
referral of their enrolled members to outside sub-contracted facilities and personnel on
a continuous 24-hour basis. HMOs have been able to provide comprehensive services
to their members at a fraction of the cost spent in the non-organized delivery sector.
The reasons postulated include: (1) better health status (fewer acute problems) among
their members due to emphasis upon primary or preventive care, and health education
of their members; (2) economies of scale, especially in administrative and record-keeping; (3) lower hospitalization rates because of (a) primary care and (b) a built-in fiscal
incentive to utilize the best, yet most efficient, treatments and resources. Quality care
is maintained by competition among HMOs and the threat of malpractice litigation.
The fiscal incentive has two facets: (1) governmental reimbursement for services on
the basis of a prospectively-approved budget, and (2) compensation from members on
a prepaid per capita basis rather than fees for services rendered. The only two factors
that counterbalance the interest of the HMO staff in cost-efficiency are malpractice suits
and competition between HMOs which is non-existent today. See generally Bovbjerg,
The Medical Malpractice Standard of Care Required of HMO Practitioners,1975 D=ra
L.J 1375.
Under the Health Security Act, HMOs can receive grants or loans for planning and
construction costs, or expansion costs, and can be subsidized in toto for operating deficits
incurred during the first five years, S. 3, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 103, 104, especially
helpful since HMOs do not reach economies of scale until their enrollments approach
30,000, which may not be accessible within the initial years of growth. Other competitive advantages for HMOs would be broader drug coverage and broader psychiatric coverage for HMO enrollees than for patients of solo practitioners. Id. §§ 22, 25. Supplementing HMOs with seventy-five percent of the differential between -their actual institutional (hospital and nursing home only) care costs and the average institutional care
costs for non-HMO-enrolled persons would be a special incentive to operate efficiently.
Id. § 87.
71. H.R. 2050, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); H.R. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975);
H.R. 5990, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. 1438, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
72. For example, under the National Health Care Act of 1975, S. 1438, 94th Cong.,
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The implementation of utilization review procedures at health
care institutions is the primary quality control under all of these types
of proposals.7 3 The Health Care Act, for example, makes utilization
review a condition of reimbursement for comprehensive ambulatory
care centers and of approval of rates by the state, which is necessary
in order to obtain federal cost-sharing.74 In addition to utilization review procedures, HMOs and Health Care Corporations (HCCs)70 must
implement in-service training programs and must provide for the continued professional education of their staff. 76 The Health Care Services Act explicitly orders each HCC to review annually the qualifications and on-the-job performance of every individual practitioner who
has contracted with the HCC in order to determine the range of treat77
ment and procedures he is competent to perform.
The expansion of preventive and ambulatory health care is also
stressed throughout all of the bills. 78 Health maintenance measures,
such as periodic checkups and immunizations, are fully covered without copayments under the Health Care Services and Comprehensive
Benefits Acts. 79 Each bill also encourages, through technical and
financial supports, the development of comprehensive ambulatory care
centers or prepaid group practice organizations (HCCs and HMOs),
which are designed to provide medical services and preventive care
1st Sess., H.R. 5990, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., a broad spectrum of benefits, similar to the
comprehensive benefits of the Health Security Act, S. 3, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., H.R. 21,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), is to be established in two installments encompassing ten
years. A flat deductible of $100 would have to be satisfied before the insurance plan
would reimburse providers for eighty percent of a patient's medical bill (i.e., twenty percent coinsurance rate). S. 1438, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 501. Total coverage, suspension of copayments, day limits, and consultation limits, is attained when medical expenses reach ten times the applicable deductible amount, or $1,000 for all persons except
those over sixty-five or with low incomes who enjoy subsidized deductibles. Id. H9 501,
531.
73. S. 3, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 51 (1975); H.R. 5990, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 308
(1975); H.R. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 244(a) (1975); H.R. 2050, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
9 1701 (1975).
74. H.R. 5990, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. H9 308, 531 (1975).
75. HCCs, established under the National Health Care Services Reorganization and
Financing Act, operate and function similarly to HMOs. 'See note 70 supra.
76. H.R. 2050, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 9H 1701, 1758 (1975); H.R. 1, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 244(a), 245 (1975); S. 3, 94th Cong., lst Sess. § 131, 142 (1975).
77. H.R. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 245 (1975).
78. S. 3, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 103(a), 47(a)(6) (1975); H.R. 1, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. § 2(C) (1975); H.R. 2050, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. H§ 2(b)(1), 1701 (1975);
H.R. 5990, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. H9 301, 308 (1975).
79. H.R. 2050, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1712 (1975); H.R. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 122 (1975).
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programs more efficaciously than the traditional health care delivery

system.8 0
Comprehensive coverage of all essential health services would
place great demand and stress upon the present health care delivery

system. One study has estimated that comprehensive coverage, as under the Health Security Act, would increase demand for ambulatory

care thirty to seventy-five percent, while requests for other, formerly
uninsured services, e.g., prescription drugs and dental care, might be

expected to increase at an even steeper rate."' Utilization of hospital
services under full coverage has been predicted to grow a "modest"
ten percent since most persons are already covered by insurance that
includes hospitalization benefits.8 80. S. 3, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 103 et seq. (1975); H.R. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.

§§ 218 et seq. (1975); H.R. 2050, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1745 (1975); H.R. 5990, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 301 et seq. (1975). To insure a competitive edge for the development of HMOs and HCCs, the federal government would subsidize ten percent of the
premiums of persons who enroll with HMOs or register with HCCs. H.R. 2050, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 1722(c) (1975); H.R. 1, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 102(C) (1975).
81. Newhouse, Phelps & Schwartz, Policy Options and the Impact of National
Health Insurance, 290 NFw ENG. J. MED. 1345, 1346 (1974). This estimate is, however, seen by some critics as a slight exaggeration, since persons in poor health, with
low incomes and low time values, would constitute a disproportionate share of those who
currently lack coverage of outpatient services prior to national health insurance. Low
income persons spend less on medical care than others, but this factor is negated when
third parties pay all or most of the medical expenses. Low time value (i.e., waiting or
travel time would not deter visits by the unemployed or salaried, as it would the "timepoor professional, executive or self-employed") and poor health would result in greater
usage of ambulatory care facilities among the newly-covered than among others. Id. at
1347; Sparer & Anderson, Utilization and Cost Experience of Low-Income Families in
Four Prepaid Group Practice Plans, 289 Naw ENO. J. MEn. 67, 69, 72 (1973). But
see Greenlick, Comparing the Use of Medical Care Services By a Medically Indigent
and a General Membership Population in a Comprehensive Prepaid Group Practice Prograin, 10 MED. CARE 187 (1972). Adding a deductible or coinsurance feature would
only serve to deny treatment to those who might need it most.
82. Newhouse, Phelps & Schwartz, supra note 81, at 1345. The HMO prepayment
scheme, whereby a member prepays an annual fee and in return receives a comprehensive range of health care services (with nominal charges for certain visits and treatments), encourages the HMO staff to keep hospitalization at a minimum. See MacLeod
& Prussin, Continuing Evolution of Health Maintenance Organizations, 288 NEw ENG.
I. MED. 439 (1973); Note, The Role of Prepaid Group Practice in Relieving the Medical
Care Crisis, 84 HARv. L. REv. 887, 921-27 (1971). One study found significant increases in inpatient service demand as well as ambulatory care demand. Broida, Lerner,
Lohrenz, et al., Impact of Membership in an Enrolled, Prepaid Population on Utilization of Health Services in Group Practices, 292 NEw ENG. J. MED. 780, 782-83 (1975).
rhe conclusions of this study are suspect, however, due to the fact that participating
physicians were salaried before joining the HMO, rather than operating on fees for service. In addition, any initial study is suspect because increased checkups and ambulatory
care will reveal acute problems ignored at first.
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IMPACT OF NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE
UPON MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE

While they may be viewed only as negotiating positions, provisions
directed specifically at the medical malpractice problem are contained
in each of the national health insurance comprehensive coverage proposals. The Health Care Act and the Health Security Act would preclude recovery in malpractice awards for expenses of treatment and rehabilitative care covered under a qualified health insurance policy or
under the Act, respectively. 3 Neither the Comprehensive Benefits
Act nor the Health Care Services Act explicitly excludes such excessive
recovery. The latter, however, does provide for internal grievance
procedures and hearings concerning monetary claims of patients
against providers.8 4
National health insurance may also be able to play a preventive
role in medical negligence. Analysis of the incidence of malpractice
claims reveals discrimination among geographical regions and between
medical specialties. Health care practitioners in urban areas, especially surgeons, incur more malpractice claims,8 5 and consequently pay
higher insurance premiums, than their rural counterparts. Concomitantly, urban areas are relatively overserved by health care practitioners,
especially dentists and surgeons, although not by hospitals, as compared
with less populated areas of the United States. 6 A more plaintiff-oriented legal climate and more alert consumerism among urban populations may account for -the difference. The general tendency of rural
populations to be treated by the local general practitioner with whom
the family has had experience and developed trust over the years may
also account for fewer malpractice claims in less populated areas, as
does the fact that many residents of rural communities go to specialists in urban areas for the type of sophisticated medical care which often forms the basis for possible malpractice actions.
Whether overrepresentation of practitioners, the presence of more
83. H.R. 5990, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 501(a) (1975); S. 3, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 54 (1975).
84. H.R. 2050, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1745(a)(9), 1757(b) (1975); H.R. 1, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. § 236 (1975).

85. Specialists are sued most often. Almost sixty percent of the malpractice suits
filed in 1970 involved surgeons. Averbach, Specializing Intensifies MalpracticeRate Is-

sue, Washington Post, May 12, 1975, at A2, col. 1. Indeed, a recent study involving
forty-four states reported that one out of every seven general surgeons is facing a mal-

practice complaint. Malpractice: Rx for a Crisis,TiME, June 16, 1975, at 49.
86. Kendall & Haldi, The Medical Malpractice Insurance Market, in MEDICAL MALPRAMCE REPORT Appendix 494, 524-29.
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specialists as opposed to general practitioners, 7 or the performance of
more surgery is responsible for the greater incidence of malpractice
claims in the urban sector, most national health insurance proposals will
help to alleviate the situation. All of the "comprehensive benefits"
bills provide financial incentives to help redistribute health care personnel to the underserviced areas of the United States. 88 The bills also
promote the development of ambulatory care centers or HMOs.89 Emphasis upon ambulatory and periodic preventive care will serve to alleviate the gap in patient-doctor rapport. Development of new levels
of health care personnel, such as ambulatory care practitioners, may
restore a type of health care provider with whom the patient can maintain a continuing relationship. In addition, association with an HMO
for all health services may facilitate rapport between the patient and
practitioner when specialty treatments or operations must be undergone. Receiving specialist care through an HMO with whom one has
had regular contact will foster more understanding, if only because of
familiarity with administrative routines, than if the patient had been referred to an "outside" specialist. At the same time, however, group
practice delivery of health care, with its centralized administration of
services, could increase the bureaucratization and assembly-line approach to providing health care. 0 Alienation of patient trust and rapport might continue, calling for a new level of health care personnel
devoted primarily to communicating with the patient, informing him of
his rights, and restoring confidence in the health care provider.
National health insurance does not specifically address itself to
malpractice premium rates, although it does suggest the possibility of
governmental regulation. Under all of the "comprehensive benefits"
bills, private health insurers must maintain an "acceptable" ratio of
premiums collected to benefits paid out. Such regulation of malpractice rates appears likely if private insurers are not excluded altogether
87. Overall, there are twice as many surgeons in proportion to the United States
population as there are in England and Wales; Americans also undergo twice as many
operations as Britons do. How Good Is Your Doctor?, NEwswEEg, Dec. 23, 1974, at
46, 48. See also Bunker, Surgical Manpower: A Comparison of Operations and Surgeons in the United States and in England and Wales, 282 NEw ENG. J. MEM. 135
(1970).
88. S. 3, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 103, 105 (1975); H.R. 5990, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
§§ 201, 202, 204 (1975).
89. See note 70 supra. According to recent government statistics, there are 173
HMO plans serving over 5,700,000 people. Owens, Where You Fit in With HMOs,
MED. ECON., Sept. 28, 1975, at 48.
90. See Mechanic, The Organization of Medical Practice and PracticeOrientations
Among Physicians in Prepaidand Nonprepaid Primary Care Settings, 13 MED. CARE 189
(1975).

Vol. 1975:1335]

NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE

1355

from the health insurance field. Equalization of insurance rates on a
national or regional basis, or governmental subsidization of malpractice
premiums, would destroy much of the financial inducement for a doctor to improve his own standard of practice. It would also decrease
the incentive among the medical profession to police its own ranks. On
the other hand, physician-owned insurance companies might provide
strong financial incentives for peer review within the policy holder
group.
Large-scale organization of the medical profession into local prepaid group practices, as promoted by most national health insurance
"comprehensive benefits" bills, could likewise provide a solution.
Medical negligence could be insured against either by the group practice or by private insurers, with the group practice as the unit of adjustment. Within the group practice, premiums could be prorated as a
percentage of salary, or paid as an operating expense of the group practice. This arrangement could create an incentive on the part of the
group practice to discipline its members and minimize malpractice.9 1
91. Individual staff members could be induced to improve their standard of practice
by profit-sharing plans among the group members, and in the group practice through
compulsory education, restriction of privileges and income, or expulsion. Strong peer
review with effective sanctions would be essential, because group insurance will blunt
the financial incentive to practice with care which is generated when the individual is
wholly responsible for the cost of malpractice insurance.
Making the group practice the unit of adjustment for insurance rates, rather than
the individual practitioner, rectifies two unwarranted disparities in current malpractice
premium rates. First, rate differentials between medical specialties would be largely
eliminated, and second, relief would become available for those practitioners who do rot
practice full time yet presently pay rates comparable to those who do, e.g., teachers and
"the retiring." While it may be argued that those practitioners who practice less than
full time are more likely to commit mistakes, the necessity of training practitioners and
the "phasing out" of practitioners' careers probably warrants granting pro rata concessions in rates. Premium differentials between general practitioners and specialists, e.g.,
between orthopedic and general surgeons, are not warranted by questions of competency.
Many factors other than general competency account for the disparities. Foremost
among such factors is the lack of past acquaintance, present communication and general
rapport between specialists and patients. Unlike the family doctor with whom the patient periodically discusses his problems, the specialist is an unknown who often treats
the patient in the impersonal confines of an operating room and who often only briefly
communicates with the patient. New York's Special Problems, MED. WORLD NEws, Feb.
24, 1975, at 25. The rapport and trust which a general practitioner enjoys with his patients are seldom experienced by the specialist. Another factor is the type of treatment
administered. The general practitioner usually indulges in minor treatments for minor
ailments. The specialist, on the other hand, engages in more radical treatments involving complex procedures and sophisticated technology. The risk of some adversity, either
an accident, negligent behavior, or unexpected complication, increases as the procedure
becomes more complex and sophisticated. Kendall & Haldi, supra note 86, at 588-90.
As long as all group practices provide a comprehensive range of services, including
high-risk specialties, group practice rates most likely will be fair, will relieve high insur-
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While preventing some forms of negligence, national health insurance may simultaneously encourage defensive medicine in its worst
form-unnecessary and potentially harmful tests and procedures. 2 Although malpractice paranoia is blamed for overutilization of ancillary
services and facilities, a want of cost controls and fiscal responsibility
among -health care providers is probably at the root of the problem. 93
Under the traditional fee-for-service system, the physician, who ordinarily makes the decision whether and by what mode to treat, passes
his costs to the patient, and usually, beyond that, to the insurer. There
is no financial incentive for the doctor to treat only when necessary and
to utilize the most efficient method available. In fact, since the doctor's income increases proportionately to his expenses, cost-saving is
discouraged. To the extent that third parties, either governments or
private insurers, cover the patient's bills, the patient also lacks incentives to save costs. National health insurance, by extending full coverage to the indigent and chronically ill, will exacerbate the lack of patient cost-consciousness.
Without financial incentives controlling the utilization of facilities
and ancillary services,94 other factors influence volume and choice. For
instance, the possibility of malpractice litigation compels the doctor to
optimize chances for an acceptable outcome regardless of cost. The
incentive to practice defensively is extremely strong because the costs
of a malpractice suit to the provider, manifested in insurance premiums, reflect not only the value of the injury in terms of patient compensation, but also the costs of defining and measuring the injury, and the
costs of shifting financial responsibility to the provider, i.e. legal fees
and insurance administration costs. The ideal balancing of costs for
optimum allocation of health care resources and optimum patient care
would counterpose the benefits of utilizing additional services to gain
more complete knowledge (in order to reduce the calculated risks of
a procedure) against the costs of adverse outcomes. But the costs of
adverse outcomes are grossly inflated under the present system because
legal and insurance costs constitute a substantial portion of tort liability
ance costs for certain specialties, and will induce high levels of quality care through competition. If all or most services are not provided by group practices, federal subsidies
will probably be necessary to sustain the independent provision of high-risk services.
92. See notes 48-53 supra and accompanying text.
93. See Project, supra note 52; Bernzweig, supra note 51, at 38-40; Freeborn, Deterininants of Medical Care Utilization: Physicians' Use of Laboratory Services, 62 AM.
J. PuB. HEALTH 846, 852 (1972).
94. An extensive discussion of defensive medicine concluded that lack of cost constraints is the primary cause of overutilization of medical resources. See Project, supra
note 52.

Vol. 1975:1335]

1357

NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE

costs. Consequently, providers are economically compelled to practice
defensively without efficient optimization of patient careY 5 The stress
which advances in medical research and education place upon the
panoply of new diagnostic and therapeutic tools available to the physician also ignores costs.96 To redress this imbalance in cost consideration, health care practitioners must bear the financial risk of overuse
of services. Prepaid group practices and utilization review procedures
impose cost-consciousness upon their staffs as to choice of diagnostic
and therapeutic approaches. Moreover, not only costs, but also deleterious effects, as from excessive radiations, must be considered. The
malpractice suit rather than peer review would be more responsive to
this latter concern. Conservative medicine, the avoidance of complex
or specialty procedures because of the high incidence of complications,
injuries, and consequently, malpractice suits, is not wholly detrimental
either. Limiting the practice of specialty procedures to specialty-certified practitioners, such as anaesthesiologists, who perform the particular procedures more frequently than general practitioners, and who
have more of an incentive to keep informed on the latest discoveries
concerning these procedures, will serve to improve the quality of care
delivered and will also reduce the need for confirmatory consultations. 97 Yet, to the extent that malpractice concerns induce practioners to remain with the traditional, commonly-practiced methods of
treatment, rather than try the latest, perhaps more effective, yet not
commonly accepted approaches, conservative medicine may retard improvement in the quality of health care.9"
IV.

THE EFFICACY OF THE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM UNDER
NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE

In general, full health care coverage under one of the "comprehensive benefits" acts should reduce the number of malpractice suits,
although without necessarily a corresponding reduction in the occurrence of medical negligence. Those persons who suffer minor injuries
95. Golladay & Smith, supra note 29, at 8.
96. Childs & Hunter, Non-Medical FactorsInfluencing Use of Diagnostic X-ray by
Physicians, 10 MED. CARE 323 (1972).

97. The Health Security Act, S. 3, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975), restricts coverage
of specialty procedures to those operations performed by certified practitioners.

98. Witness the legal problems incurred by the innovator of the spinal jack operation, now commonly employed under the name of Harrington Rod, to correct scoliosis,
referred to in the informed consent suit in Fiorentino v. Wenger, 26 App. Div. 2d 693,

272 N.Y.S.2d 557 (2d Dep't 1966); an appeal was taken by the hospital alone in Fiorentino v. Wenger, 19 N.Y.2d 407, 227 N.E.2d 296, 280 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1967).

be argued later, PSROs may have the same effect.

As will
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allegedly due to negligence and therefore require a small amount of
additional medical care, such as a subsequent operation to remove a
forgotten sponge, will probably not sue their health care provider since
their insurance will cover the cost of the original and any additional
medical care. None of the "comprehensive benefits" bills discusses this
correctional care, but it would most likely be covered where medically
necessary. When cosmetic surgery and other elective procedures
would be appropriate -to rectify any harm caused by medical negligence, the patient would have to recover against the medical personnel
or institution at fault, since such nonessential care is not covered by
national health insurance. Even though all "comprehensive benefits"
bills, except the Health Security Act, demand twenty percent copayments for many charges, it is doubtful that this cost to the patient will
have great impact in most cases. If the twenty percent charge becomes
a significant cost to the patient, catastrophic coverage would be triggered, thereby eliminating any charge to the patient. Recovery for lost
wages would still be received through a tort suit. The "catastrophic
benefits" bills would reduce the number of malpractice suits by a
lesser degree, since only extensive or very expensive correctional treatment would be covered by insurance. However, eliminating some of
the "police" function that private malpractice suits perform will put additional strain on either internal or administrative regulatory procedures
to check the occurrence of medical negligence.
However, to the extent that national health insurance coverage
will eliminate direct payment of expensive medical bills, some small
impact upon the overall malpractice problem should be expected,99
since the patient will only be likely to pursue the malpractice claim if
a true injury has occurred, rather than because his total expenses appear oppressive.
The medical negligence problem must be handled by implementing procedures to improve the quality of medical care, designing a
more efficient compensation system, and installing procedures to make
the health care system more responsive to the consumer. Moreover,
all this must be accomplished at a socially-acceptable cost.
A. Quality Control. Recognition that the medical malpractice
insurance crisis has arisen because most suits are the result of actual
medical injuries often caused by negligence, leads to the conclusion
99. It should be noted, however, that Britain, which has a nationalized health service in which medical costs are fully paid by the government, is experiencing a rise in
malpractice suits comparable to that in the United States. Curran, supra note 47, at
252.
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that more effective quality control mechanisms are needed.
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bility of the medical malpractice suit as one mechanism for regulating
the quality of health care depends upon the ability of alternative proce-

dures to perform the function with comparable efficacy. The essence
of quality control is control by the person receiving services, so that
in this sense the term is used to mean "accountability." In addition
to private policing by patient-victims through malpractice suits, 100 possible vehicles for quality monitoring include internal policing by health-

care providers, and external policing by administrative agencies.
Regulation by an outside administrative body has never been attempted, and judging from analogous regulatory failures this method

seems unattractive. 10 1 Compared to the privately-initiated malpractice
suit, peer review is also a poor substitute. Established peer review
programs, such as utilization review committees and PSROs, lack
the degree of adversity present in privately-initiated malpractice actions. 10 1 Doctors and other health care providers are not motivated to
discipline their peers by the monetary incentives that encourage pa-

tients to press malpractice claims.

Professional pride is a limited in-

centive; while the desire to keep the stature of doctors and other med-

ical practitioners at a high level may sometimes compel the elimination
100. See Roemer, Controlling and Promoting Quality in Medical Care, 35 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 284, 297 (1970):
As a sort of last resort for quality control, one may consider the rights of
the patient to sue the doctor or hospital or both for harm suffered from
improper medical care. The exercise of this right has obviously been increasing in recent years, as patients-with the aid of lawyers--have become more
aware of it, as the sanctity of the medical profession in the public eye has
diminished, and as the courts have become more demanding of what may be
expected of the average provider of medical service.
The Waxman Report of the California Assembly Select Committee on Medical Malpractice (June 1974) considered alternatives to the medical malpractice suit and found
that
[w]hile there do exist quality control mechanisms within the government and
medical establishment, these mechanisms are not sufficiently effective. At the
present time, malpractice litigation is clearly the most significant external pressure prompting physicians to practice quality medicine. Cartwright, Change
Tort System?: Con, Man. WoRLD NEws, Sept. 8, 1975, at 60, 64.
101. Administrative agencies also lack sufficient flexibility to monitor the rapidly
changing standards of health care.
102. A preliminary inquiry is needed to determine what degree of adversity is optimal
for ferreting out and preventing medical negligence. Since estimates show that the number of malpractice claims actually filed represents only a fraction of the potential claims
possible for injuries due to participation in the health care system, Rudov, Myers & Mirabella, supra note 11, at 13, 20-21, the level of adversity manifested in malpractice claims
appears less than optimal. The discontinuity of personal medical care needs supports
the notion that patient adversity alone is insufficient for inducing improvement of health
care services. The desire among discharged patients not to return to an institution for
treatment, or undergo treatment for the same illness again, counters the incentive to sue
in order to alter the procedures of a doctor or health care institution.
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of gross incompetency, the incentive is likely to wane when the deterrence of technical incompetency, such as not having kept abreast of
the most recent and most effective medical procedures, is the objective.
Thus, in order to evaluate the adequacy of peer review programs,
it is necessary to determine whether health care providers alone can
attain at least the level of adversity generated through private medical
malpractice suits. Group practices which operate on a profit-sharing
basis offer a financial incentive for more extensive peer review coupled
with more severe sanctions. °3 All of the "comprehensive benefits"
bills stress the expansion of the group practice mode of delivery. To
the extent that ihe staff of an HMO is concerned with the financial
viability of the organization or receives supplemental income according
to a profit-sharing scheme, a financial incentive exists to scrutinize and
discipline peers. However, group practice organizations usually compensate their staffs with an adequate base salary. This guarantee of
a comfortable financial position mutes the incentive to discipline
peers.'0 4 Money supplements for continued professional education,
expanding areas of expertise, or keeping the incidence of medical injuries below a targeted level might raise the competency level of individual and institutional health care providers, but would not create
the financial incentive to "beef up" peer review programs. Since the
medical profession already enjoys the highest esteem among vocational
roles, an appeal to professional pride will not necessarily produce intensified peer review and discipline. To date the strongest generators
of peer review within health care institutions have been laws which
condition funding or reimbursement upon effective utilization review
programs, 0 5 and malpractice suits holding hospitals liable for inadequate monitoring of staff performance.10 Since it is doubtful that doctors will be provided with an incentive sufficient to lead them to discipline their peers, and since malpractice awards provide a strong
stimulus for health care institutions to scrutinize their staffs, it appears
the private malpractice suit will still be necessary for monitoring the
quality of patient care.
In addition to these practical and historical considerations, it currently appears that the PSRO program is being implemented in such
a way as to encourage the use of additional medical tests and proce103. See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
104. See Note, The Role of Prepaid Group Practice,supra note 82.
105. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 92-603 (1972) (PSRO legislation).
106. See Darling v. Charlestown Community Mem. Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d
253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966) (case result caused changes in hospital
procedure).
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dures with little or no regard for cost, 10 7 and with no record of the effectiveness of the tests and procedures encouraged. 08 As Professor

Clark Havighurst has concluded, "PSRO legislation alone does not supply the incentive needed to make PSROs achieve more than minor improvements over 'business as usual'."'0 9

This leaves us with the private malpractice action. Not only does
the system present a pervasive method of accountability for individual
action, it also gives the patient a status more equal to that of the health

care provider. The ability of the patient to bring a malpractice suit
if he feels it warranted has a potentially great psychological value, as

does the knowledge that a lay jury from the community, rather than
a panel of "defendant-sympathetic experts," will determine the outcome of the suit. Limiting quality monitoring to internal peer review

control would increase suspicion about the best efforts of health care
providers."10

Moreover, while malpractice litigation cannot substitute

for more comprehensive systems of review (such as PSRO, PEP, or
utilization review),"' it can serve to weed out the extremely incompe-

tent and often dangerous practitioner that these systems either miss or
permit to continue to practice. 1

2

Malpractice findings should also be

routinely made available to licensing authorities so that removal or suspension of licenses can be undertaken where appropriate.

To date

only a few states have made attempts to "feed back" malpractice case
107. Havighurst & Blumstein, Coping With Quality/Cost Trade-Ofs in Medical Care:
The Role of PSROs, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 6 (1975).
108. See R. CARLSON, TAE END OF MEDICTNE (1975); I. ILLicH, MEDCAL NE MESIS
(1975).
109. Havighurst & Blumstein, supra note 107, at 68.
110. This psychological need could be satisfied by allowing patients to instigate disciplinary proceedings against providers within peer review groups, although the feeling
of impartiality emanating from a judicial determination would be compromised.
111. See Degenshein & Ceccarelli, The End Result System, 292 NEw ENG. J. MED.
704 (1975); Gonnella & Zeleznik, Factors Involved in Comprehensive Patient Care
Evaluation, 12 MED. CARE 928 (1974); Grimm, Evaluation of Patient Care Protocol Use
by Various Providers, 292 NEw ENG. J. MED. 507 (1975); Nelson, Relation Between
Quality Assessment and Utilization Review in a Functioning PSRO, 292 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 671 (1975); Williamson, Evaluating Quality of Patient Care, 218 J.A.M.A. 564
(1971). Complications are usually monitored as well as outcomes. Deviation from a
selected tolerable range triggers a process review to determine whether certain procedures were carried out whenever a particular condition or complication was indicated.
If the process analysis reveals that staff procedures were deficient, either new guidelines
are promulgated or special education is imposed upon selected personnel. Process checklists, such as PEP, are utilized regularly by institutional staffs as guides for care.
112. One situation involved Dr. lohn Nork, a California surgeon, who over the
course of a decade allegedly performed more than thirty unnecessary laminectomies that
left many of his patients crippled for life. Gonzales v. Nork, Civil No. 228566 (Sacramento Super. Ct., Nov. 19, 1973).
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findings for quality control purposes.' 18 Wasting this source of exten-

sive review of health care providers' performance seems deplorable." 4
Finally, the ultimate effect of a properly functioning tort system
would be to minimize the total number of injuries by giving those re-

sponsible for them a financial (or other) incentive to reduce such injuries. This function is accomplished by at least two methods in medical malpractice litigation: through insurance premiums and through
a public trial. The premium impact can be minimized severely if physicians are permitted to pass on easily the increases in their rates to

their patients, either directly or through third-party reimbursement.
Under a system of national health insurance, it may also be appropriate
for a federal agency to take over the malpractice insurance business
altogether, and for the federal government under proper circumstances
to pay a physician's entire malpractice premium. In these circumstances there would be little, if any, financial incentive to avoid sloppi113. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFEry CODE § 1305(a) (West Supp. 1975):
Every insurer providing professional liability insurance to a health facility...
shall report .. , to the state department any final judgment over three thousand dollars ($3,000) rendered against such health facility . . . in, or any
settlement over three thousand dollars ($3,000) . . . of, a claim or action for
damages for personal injuries caused by an error, omission, or negligence in
the performance of its professional services, or by the performance of its professional services without consent.
See also IND. ANN. STAT. § 16-9.5-6-2 (Bums 1975) (The "appropriate board of professional registration and examination" shall be apprised of the name of "every" health care
provider (except hospitals) against whom a judgment is rendered or settlement made so
that the board may review the "fitness of the health care provider to practice his profession.").
114. Stimeling, Information Feedback Might Avert Medical Mishaps, J. LEGAL MED.
29 (June 1975). It should be noted, however, that there are definite drawbacks to this
method. Malpractice awards and settlements are poor indices of the need for disciplinary sanctions or education improvements. Most malpractice cases are tried by juries
whose non-expert findings cannot be readily or reliably interpreted to determine when
to restrict privileges or impose educational requirements. Jury, and judicial, confusion
of negligent or incompetent practice with unusual medical results, in particular, makes
their findings an inappropriate basis for imposing followup remedies. Malpractice settlements reflect considerations of time, cost, adverse publicity, and the possibility of losing
before what are conceived to be plaintiff-sympathizing juries, as well as strict issues of
fault. Moreover, the size of jury awards and out-of-court settlements sometimes relate
to the severity of the injury or the rarity of the result, rather -than to the seriousness
of the incompetent behavior. However, malpractice claims (after a medico-legal lay
screening panel has eliminated the non-meritorious cases), settlements and awards could
be used to trigger peer group investigations and the imposition of sanctions, although
the time lag between the negligent act and the malpractice finding would diminish the
effectiveness of such procedures. Remedial education or disciplinary measures would
then be recommended by health care providers reviewing the performance of their peers,
depending upon whether negligence, gross incompetence, technical incompetence or lack
of scientific understanding was responsible for the adverse result. Thus, malpractice
findings alone are not effective data for these quality control purposes, but rather could
be used to supplement the peer review requirements of national health insurance plans.
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ness. One way to retain such incentive, however, would be to include
a deductible in all malpractice insurance policies that is sufficiently
large to provide a financial incentive to avoid negligence. Such a deductible could, for example, range from five to twenty-five thousand
dollars, and could vary on the basis of income. It would not be recoupable through either increased fees or third party reimbursements.
While deductibles have often been proposed as a way of preventing

patients from abusing the health-care delivery system through overuse,
it is ironic that they are almost never mentioned as a way to prevent
system abuse by providers. 115 In addition, since the vast majority
of medical malpractice suits are settled for much less than five thousand

dollars,"" such a system could also drastically reduce insurance premiums.
Insofar as a public trial is seen as distasteful to physicians and psy-

chologically important to patients it should be retained to fulfill a deterrent role-both in encouraging physicians to avoid the necessity of ex-

periencing it, and in assuring patients that it is available to them if they
are negligently injured.
B. Compensation for Injury. In addition to promoting quality
health care, the tort liability system also compensates victims of medical
negligence. While coverage under national health insurance will re-

lieve part of this problem by removing most medical expenses from the
computation of damages, tort litigation would still seem to be necessary
in order to allow the plaintiff-patient to recover the remaining elements
which presently form the basis for compensation, such as lost wages,
pain and suffering, and punitive damages. Nevertheless, the medical

malpractice liability system is a somewhat deficient compensating
mechanism. First, not all negligently caused injuries are compensated.

To receive compensation, the patient-victim must at least be able and
115. The only example we have been able to find of the use of deductibles in medical
malpractice is not entirely encouraging, however. In that instance an insurance executive noted that one of his insured physicians was paying an annual premium of about
$18,000 a year, with a $2,500 deductible per claim. He went on to note that he was
"a superb doctor. His problem is that he handles an enormous patient load, makes at
least $400,000 a year and to do it successfully, he cuts comers. By doing this he has
small malpractice claims which normally his deductible takes care of. He doesn't really
damage people-he never cuts off the wrong leg or any of the other dreadful things you
often read about. But he does have four to five claims a year." Barnett, Medical Malpractice Suits Vex, 318 J. COMMERCE, Nov. 27, 1973, at 2 (quoting K.C. Eberhard, executive vice-president, Signal-Imperial Insurance Group of Los Angeles). As this example illustrates, payment of a deductible may only encourage physicians to spread
themselves even thinner, taking more patients than they may be able to adequately deal
with in order to increase their gross income.
116. See Rudov, Myers & Mirabella, supra note 11, at 13.
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willing to sue the health care provider in a medical malpractice action.
Legal counsel must be hired, medical testimony in some form (either
textbook evidence or expert witnesses) must be available, and the patient-victim must be willing to expend time and commitment on a
lengthy trial if an initial settlement is not forthcoming. Thus, only the
most sensational and severe injuries are consistently pursued. 117 Plaintiff lawyers estimate that they accept only one in eight clients who attempt to engage their services.11 8 While spurious claims may represent a substantial portion of those cases refused, many claims are rejected because the potential recovery is too low or it is too difficult to
obtain sufficient evidence of medical negligence.11 Add to that figure
the meritorious claims which the patient-victim does not pursue because he considers the cost and energy expenditure of litigation prohibitive, and the conclusion is that the medical malpractice liability system only compensates a small percentage of the victims of medical negligence.
Second, only a small percentage of the malpractice insurance
premiums paid by health care providers is received by patient-victims
as compensation for their injuries. Ideally, health care providers
should bear the financial burden of negligent medical treatment, i.e.
providers should directly reimburse patient-victims for the value of
their losses due to negligently-caused injuries. Of course, in the final
analysis, society as a whole always bears the financial burden of medical negligence through increases in health care prices. However, under the present compensation system, almost eighty percent of health
20
care provider premiums are allocated for legal and insurance costs.'
Such a large overhead seems grossly inefficient.
Third, the medical malpractice liability system sometimes confuses
actual medical malpractice with injuries caused by presently unavoidable risks inherent to certain procedures, or not preventable because
of imprecise medical knowledge.' 21 Patient-victims who have incurred
rare or unexpected injuries are often presumed by courts, and especially by juries, to have received negligent treatment. Unreasonable
117. See notes 37-43 supra and accompanying text.
118. Dietz, Baird & Berul, supra note 17, at 97.
119. See id. at 97-100.
120. See note 14 supra.
121. W. PROSSER, supra note 16, at 228. See generally Wolfsmith v. Marsh, 51 Cal.
2d 832, 337 P.2d 70 (1959); Seneris v. Haas, 45 Cal. 2d 811, 827, 291 P.2d 915, 924
(1955); Rubsamen, Res Ipsa Loquitur in California Medical Malpractice Law-Expansion of a Doctrine to the Bursting Point, 14 STAN. L. REv. 251, 270-80 (1962).
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can supply cures for all ailments have
public expectations that medicine
1 22
helped to foster such confusion.
When it forces health care providers to insure patients against the
calculated risk of an adverse outcome, malpractice liability imposes an

unwarranted burden upon these providers and misallocates our limited
health care resources. Yet, more troublesome than the financial burden, which the providers can pass on through higher fees, is the stigma-

tization of practitioners as negligent or incompetent because their pafients incurred an unexpected complication or outcome. Compensation for rare adverse results should not be sought through the tort liability system unless the stigma of negligence and incompetence is care-

fully reserved for a true negligence finding, and is not associated solely
with a compensation award for the plaintiff. However, divorcing these

two concepts appears unlikely within the present tort liability system.
For the reasons elaborated above,' 2 3 the tort liability system should be

restricted to resolving allegations of medical negligence, with arbitration 24 and medico-legal screening panels' 25 supplementing the adjudi122. See Altman, Doctors Told, supra note 8.
123. See notes 100-22 supra and accompanying text.
124. Arbitration is a nongovernmental procedure for settlement of disputes between
private parties. Parties to a dispute submit their differences to the judgment of an impartial party appointed either by mutual consent or statutory provision. Thus, the decision to arbitrate may be initiated by agreement of the parties or be imposed upon them.
Both approaches are currently being used to a small extent for settlement of malpractice
disputes. Arbitration imposed by statute or by court decision is generally applied to disputes under a certain maximum amount, with the jury trial system preserved for the
larger cases. See Bergen, Arbitration of Medical Liability, 211 J.A.M.A. 175, 176
(1970).
Proponents of arbitration maintain that it lowers legal fees, allowing small claims
and claims involving difficult evidentiary problems to be compensated. Legal costs are
lowered because only a short time is permitted for case preparation, cross-examination
is not allowed, and strict evidentiary rules are suspended, thereby allowing hearsay and
other excludable evidence to be produced in order to establish a cause of action. In
addition, the need for expert witnesses is diminished since the arbitration panel is usually
composed of health care experts who are acceptable to both sides. See Averbach, A
Plaintiffs Attorney Says: Malpractice Cases Don't Belong in the Courts!, Hosp. PHysicr. 56 (Jan. 1969); Coulson, The Malpractice Mess: Is Arbitration the Answer?, 99
MIED. TIMES 131 (Oct. 1971); Ludlam & Hassard, Arbitration, 114 CAL. MED. 102 (May
1971); Arbitration of MalpracticeClaims, 28 ARiz. MED. 391 (May 1971).
Where arbitration is final and binding, the same saving of costs holds true. Where
appeal for a trial de novo is allowed, limitations can be placed upon the appeal procedure
to restrain appeals and thereby effectuate a cost saving. The appellant, under appropriate circumstances, can be charged the costs of appeal and the appellee's legal fees, as
well as be required to post a security bond guaranteeing the payment of appellate costs.
Another possible restraint is the admission at trial of the arbitration panel's findings,
either as presumptions or merely as evidence. Even when such cost and evidentiary restraints are not imposed upon the appeal process, arbitration should lessen the judicial
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cation process. Imposing arbitration for claims which probably would
not result in profitable recoveries if fully litigated (e.g., below a
burden by discouraging those claims which cannot be proved even before the more permissive arbitration panel, with its relaxed evidentiary standards.
The availability of a prompt decision by arbitration may encourage early settlement
of claims. For the health care provider there is the benefit of comparative privacy and
an absence of public cross-examination. No transcript is required unless by party request, and the arbitrator's decisions are not published. Arbitration awards would probably attract less attention than jury awards, especially if the amounts were in accord
with predetermined schedules. Arbitrationof MalpracticeClaims, supra, at 392.
Of course, the lack of publicity has negative consequences for quality control, especially if transcripts and records are not made of the arbitration hearing. The feedback
from malpractice cases that could be potentially harnessed for quality control purposes
would be eliminated if arbitration panel hearings were not recorded. In general, the
more subdued level of publicity would put greater pressure upon peer review and disciplinary measures to sustain the quality level of health care. Therefore, it should be recommended that arbitration findings be fully reported for quality control purposes. Reporting of arbitration findings could be accomplished in two forms. One system could
report findings sans nomina. Such reporting would locate problem areas or institutions
needing intensified preventive programs against injuries and negligence, yet at the same
time not damage the reputations of individual practitioners. The alternative to this
method, full disclosure of the names of practitioners found negligent, would exert pressure directly upon the individual practitioners to improve their health care practices.
Those who are critical of the use of arbitration to resolve malpractice claims contend that the major motivation behind establishing arbitration is to benefit hospitals,
doctors, and the insurance industry, with little benefit for the patient. See The Case
for Arbitration, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 48, at 8, 12. They argue that the
proposed advantages of speed and economy apply only to the hearing phase, since it
neither reduces the overall time required for claim resolution nor economizes greatly the
preparation phase.
It must be conceded that to the extent that arbitration attempts to resolve claims
with finality, the costs of operation to the parties may well approach those of a judicial
proceeding. Moreover, if the arbitration system employed is not binding on the parties,
it may add yet another expensive stage to the current jury trial process. Cf. Baird, Munsterman & Stevens, Alternatives to Litigation, I: Technical Analysis, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT Appendix 214, 215 (present arbitration plans reduce court dockets
by only 0.7% of the total volume of malpractice claims).
125. See Karcher, Malpractice Claims Against Doctors: New Jersey's Screening Procedure, 53 A.B.A.I. 328 (1967); Matte, A Neutral Screen, TRIAL 34 (Mar./Apr. 1973);
Williams, Joint Medico-Legal Plan for Screening Medical Malpractice Cases, 96 VA.
MED. MoNTHLY 297 (1969); Are Malpractice Screening Panels the Answer?, MED.
EcoN., Mar. 1, 1971, at 106; Documentary Supplement, Medical-Legal Screening Panels
as an Alternative Approach to Medical Malpractice Claims, 13 WM. & MARY L. REv.
695 (1972). Indiana's scheme places three physicians and one non-voting lawyer-chairperson on the panel. Conspicuously absent is any consumer or patient-advocate representative. IND. ANN. STAT. § 16-9.5-9 (Burns 1975). See New Indiana Law Will Cut
Negligence Suits, supra note 34.
Mandatory mediation panels have been employed recently in New York with positive results in decreasing the number of cases proceeding to trial and in reducing the
amounts of compensation. The three-member mediation panels consist of a state supreme court justice, a lawyer, and a physician. Parties may be represented by counsel,
the hearings are informal, and no stenographic record is kept. If the case proceeds to
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$10,000 potential recovery threshold) would result in more equitable
resolution of malpractice claims. Injured patients for whom the costs
of malpractice litigation are prohibitive could receive a less costly, expedited decision as to whether malpractice was the cause, thereby making less seriously, yet negligently, injured persons eligible for relief.
Mandatory screening panels, through a preliminary opinion on the merits, could encourage settlements or abandonment of claims.
Following a determination of negligence by the appropriate adjudicative procedure, i.e. litigation, arbitration, and/or screening panel,
a simplified hearing before a regional panel of compensation experts
could decide a value for the injury, perhaps based in part on a compensation schedule. The panel could be composed of physicians, lawyers,
insurance experts, and consumers, who would sit on the board for a
staggered tenure of about three years, thereby allowing each member
to become experienced in the field of compensation, yet without allowing any particular individual to become entrenched in an extremely
powerful position. A sitting panel would probably reduce the arbitrariness of awards, be less susceptible to emotional pleas, and be more responsive to the actual damage value of the injury. Employment of a
schedule of benefits as a base would also stabilize awards. The compensation schedule would originally be based on present medical malpractice awards and insurance industry figures, but would be continually revised and updated based on actual panel experience in the area
and changes in the community. It should be noted that the crucial factor which differentiates this scheme from a "no fault" system is that
no compensation will be awarded by this panel unless a finding of negligence has been previously made through adjudicative means.
C. Responsiveness to Consumers. A major problem with large

hospitals and HMOs is their increasing depersonalization. Health care
administrators often overlook the fact that while medical personnel may
be familiar with their institution's routine, most outsiders are not, and
that this unfamiliarity can cause irritation and anxiety. Even under the
best circumstances, being a patient in a hospital or in an HMO can
make a person uncomfortable and can magnify his dissatisfaction with
his medical treatment.'

26

trial, statements made in the course of the hearings are not admissible. Ragan, A Malpractice Experiment in New York, 10l MED. TIMS 23 (Feb. 1972). See AMA Malpractice Liability PlanAccents Risk Control of Doctors,TRrA, 5 (Sept./Oct. 1971); Lee,
New Court Directions: The Medical MalpracticeMediation Program, 9 TRIAL AWYERS
Q. 86 (1973); Owens, Compulsory Malpractice Mediation: Don't Sell It Short, Mm.

EcoN., June 9, 1975, at 94, 99.
126. See Annas, supra note 20.
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The quality of the relationship between the patient and the health
care provider, whether doctor, hospital, or HMO, may of course influence the patient's decision whether to file a malpractice suit.'2 7 The
health care provider's failure to recognize this fact often creates an atmosphere for future problems and complications to develop into a malpractice action. The claim itself is often merely the tangible evidence
12 8
of the final breakdown of the patient-provider relationship.
Numerous factors lead to this breakdown. Interpersonal problems between the provider and the patient may cause a dissolution of
the necessary rapport during the course of therapy. Some physicians
charge that lawyers and legal rules are at the base of the deterioration
of the doctor-patient relationship. 2 9 However, physicians are aware
that they may be the cause of this problem. In one recent survey, forty
percent of doctors responding named "poor communication between
physicians and patient" as the single most common cause of malpractice
suits.' 30 In many instances a genuine misunderstanding exists on one
or both sides. The physician may believe that he has explained everything, but the patient may not have understood and may be fearful of
asking questions. This problem is particularly acute with those patients who belong to low-status classes in society. Physicians occupy
a high status position, and status differentials in general are maintained
and acknowledged by various forms of deference. Generally, the
greater the social distance between the doctor and patient, the more
reluctant the patient will be about questioning or confronting the physician.
There is a general need for more effective communication between physician and patient, particularly as to diagnosis, proposed
course of treatment, and possible complications, since these items have
the most potential for malpractice litigation. In addition, changes in
the type of care physicians render have aggravated the communications
problem. Doctors have begun to spend more of their time with the
acutely ill, performing such tasks as reading laboratory and x-ray reports, while devoting very little time to the "routinely" ill and their
health care questions. Although this shift sharpens the physicians'
technical skills, it diminishes their reliance on physical examinations
127. See Kupers, It Takes More Than Insurance to Protect Against Malpractice Suits,
J. LEGAL MED. 33 (Mar. 1975).

128. Bachman, Doctors: Move Closer to Your Patient!, TRAL 25 (May/June 1975).
129. See Ferber & Martin, New Prey for Ambulance Chasers?, MED. EcoN., Apr. 28,
1975, at 126; Quicksilver-Emotion and Fear, TRIAL 15 (May/June 1975).
130. Pabst, A Medical Opinion Survey of Physicians' Attitudes on Medical Malpractice, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT Appendix 83, 84.
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viders, on their part, have done little or nothing to limit those expectations, preferring instead to enjoy the esteem and economic and social
status of their position.'3 6
The medical malpractice crisis may, in fact, be due in large measure to the failure to recognize the human needs of patients, the professional limitations of providers, and the shared responsibilities of members of the community for the health of their fellow citizens. With rare
exceptions, the tort liability system provides the only mechanism by
which patients who have, or think they have, suffered an injury as a
result of negligent medical treatment can obtain redress.
A number of hospitals have recognized this problem, and have developed a system of "patient representatives" to help "humanize" the
hospital atmosphere. This innovation followed a recommendation by
the Report of the Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice that
every hospital establish a patient grievance mechanism.' 37 However,
few of the approximately 350 systems presently functioning in hospitals
as patient grievance mechanisms have adequate authority to deal with
those problems which often lead to malpractice claims.1 38 The job description of the patient service representatives instructs them to deal
with non-medical, non-fiscal, minor complaints of a public relations nature, thereby limiting these representatives to a cosmetic role in the patient care continuum. 3 9 Although many of these efforts are to be applauded, none operate on the major complaints which induce malpractice suits, and therefore can provide only a marginal40 reduction in the
incidence of such suits against health care institutions.
This problem becomes more acute under a system of national
health insurance, since the provision of health care services could well
become increasingly institutionalized and impersonal. A recent survey
of IMO officials revealed that many viewed the large organizational
character of their facility as likely to make their patients more4 willing
to sue the HMO than they would be to sue a private practitioner.' '
While the elimination of direct payments by the patient under a
system of national health insurance will make care more available to
136. Altman, Doctors Told, supra note 8.
137. MEDIcAL MALPRACTCnE REPORT 84.
138. Profile of Patients' Rights and Hospital Patient Representatives, HEALTH PERsPE rVEs 3 (Feb./Mar. 1974).
139. According to the American Hospital Association, patient service representatives
exist in 462 hospitals. Thompson, Lupton, Renck, et al., Patient Grievance Mechanisms
in Health Care Institutions, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT Appendix 758, 760.
140. See, e.g., Cote, The Patient'sLink, TRIAL 28, 29 (Mar./Apr. 1973).
141. Curran & Moseley, The MalpracticeExperience of Health Maintenance Organizations, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 69, 81 (1975).
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Intimate rapport with patients is not only good medical practice,
but is also a prime malpractice prophylactic. 3 2 The interpersonal relationship between doctor and patient, rather than any technical or scientific achievement, often prevents a patient from suing his physician.
It is interesting to note that in many states with a low incidence of
malpractice litigation, such as Montana, New Hampshire, and Vermont,
there are large numbers of rural communities in which close, personal
33
relationships develop over the years between physician and patient.1
This pattern differs dramatically from the overall trend of an increasing
percentage of health care being provided through neighborhood health
clinics, IMOs, and outpatient departments of hospitals. Institutionalized medicine tends to be far more impersonal than care provided
by a trusted family doctor, and many patients feel unable to make their
needs and complaints effectively known in these settings. The shift
toward institutionalized medicine accounts for the findings of a recent
survey which demonstrated that most people felt that the doctor-patient
34
relationship today is not as good as it was twenty years ago.'
Patients often have unrealistic expectations regarding the outcome
of medical treatment, based in part on misinformation. These patients
will likely be disappointed, but some patient dissatisfaction might have
been avoided had the doctors involved discovered the patient's expectations and, where necessary, attempted to redirect those expectations
in more realistic directions. Perhaps all patients have come to have
expectations which are far out of proportion with reality.'35 And pro131. Childs & Hunter, Non-Medical FactorsInfluencing Use of Diagnostic X-Ray by
Physicians, 10 MED. CARE 323 (1972); Donaldson & London, Time Study of Doctors
and Nurses at Two Swedish Health Care Centers, 9 MED. CARE 457 (1971); Freeborn,
Determinants of Medical Care Utilization: Physicians' Use of Laboratory Services, 62
AM. J. Pun. HEALTH 846 (1972); Hardwick, Clinical Styles and Motivation: A Study
of Laboratory Test Use, 13 MED. CARE 397 (1975); Mechanic, General Medical Practice: Some Comparisons Between the Work of Primary Care Physicians in the United
States and England and Wales, 10 MED. CARE 402 (1972).
132. See How to Avoid Malpractice Suits, MED. WORLD NEWS, Sept. 22, 1975, at 61,
62.
133. Giddings, Why the Malpractice Plague Is Passing Some States By, MED. ECON.,
May 26, 1975, at 37. See also Thurlow, Yes, There Is a Malpractice Paradise, MED.
ECON., Jan. 18, 1971, at 142.
134. Peterson, Consumers' Knowledge of and Attitudes Toward Medical Malpractice,
in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE REPORT Appendix 658.
135. Wilson, Doc Welby Wows Public, Gives Med Biz Shot in Head, Boston Sun.
Globe, June 29, 1975, at A7, col. 2; Malpractice, Rx for a Crisis, supra note 85, at 4950.
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many, it also may make the provider less concerned about patient acceptance and attitudes than in a system in which the patient directly
compensates the provider. It will -therefore be necessary to build into
the system some mechanism, at least at the hospital and HMO level,
to help the patient exercise his legal rights and obtain all the information he needs about his medical condition, the health care facilities, the
proposed treatment and its risks and benefits, alternative treatments,
problems of recuperation, and staff qualifications.1 42 To perform this
function, and simultaneously to decrease the number of malpractice
suits prompted by impersonal attention, inadequate preparation for an
adverse reaction or result, unnecessary surgery, and poor physician-patient and staff-patient relationships, we propose the development of a
national medico-legal office with representatives in every major hospital and IMO.
These representatives would work for the national health insurance system. This separation of the representatives from the health
care institution is essential for the proper functioning of the mechanism. Each representative must know that his primary obligation is to
provide assistance for the patient, and that his relationship with the hospital or other medical facility is not one of employer to employee. In
this way the representative could feel free, when necessary, to oppose
those decisions which the institution might think in its own best interest, without fear of financial repercussions.
Every member of the medico-legal office would be legally empowered to help patients exercise their legal rights to such things as
full and complete medical information, consultations, treatment refusals, discharge delays, and transfer requests. 143 In order to have an
adequate awareness of -these rights and knowledge of the manner in
which they function in the health care continuum, it seems essential
to have the personnel of the office composed of individuals from diverse disciplines, including, but not limited to, representatives of
law, medicine, social work, and psychology.
On the individual hospital or HMO level, there would be a separate medico-legal office, again staffed with similar personnel who are
in the employ of the national health insurance system and not of the
particular health care institution in which the specific office is located.
142. See Annas & Healey, The Patient Rights Advocate: Redefining the DoctorPatientRelationship in the HospitalContext, 27 VAND. L. RFv. 243 (1974).
143. See generally G. ANNAS, THm RIGHTS OF HOsPrrAL PATIENTS (1975); JOINT
COMM. ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HosPITALS 1-2
(1973).
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These representatives would be available to -help resolve patient-staff
disputes at the facility level without resort to litigation. This function
would include settlement attempts following the occurrence of a medico-legal problem, 144 as well as efforts to prevent problems through
early interaction with patients,1 45 and provider-patient education concerning applicable health law issues, particularly patients' rights.: 46 In
addition, the representatives would collect data on the types of patient
complaints that most often lead to malpractice actions, using this information as a basis for devising methods for preventing these problems

in the future. Thus, the ultimate goal of a properly functioning medi144. This function would include categorization of common patient complaints, with
notation of appropriate measures called for, and accompaniment of the patient by the
representative throughout the in-hospital attempt at resolution. It could also include, assuming authority was received from the health facility's insurance carrier, settlement
negotiations.
145. This could be accomplished in the following manner. Upon completion of
registration for each patient, the clerk would page the patient representative to inform
him of the patient's arrival. As soon as it is medically permissible, the representative
would explain to the patient that if at any time during his visit, or a subsequent visit
concerning a related complaint, he desires assistance in resolving any problems-such
as billing, communications with the provider, or medical care-he should ask to speak
with the patient representative. It should be noted as well that the entire staff of the
facility should be informed of the services of the medico-legal office and its personnel.
In addition, they should be encouraged to call the office if any situation arises in which
the patient desires assistance from the representative.
146. Provider-patient education programs might be developed in numerous ways.
For example, there could be a mini-course, consisting of two sessions of two hours' duration, which would be required of the entire staff of the institution. These courses would
include instruction in problems of communication (e.g., importance of clear communication, ways of documenting what has been communicated, common pitfalls in communication); recognition of medico-legal problems; the role and function of the medico-legal
office personnel; the type of patient complaints received or anticipated; the procedures
for handling specific problem situations; and several important legal principles, such as
informed consent and access to medical records. A broader, nine-month seminar program could then be offered to the staff. Participation in this would be optional, but
highly encouraged. Each session would meet for two hours a month. The material to
be covered would include medical decision-making; recognizing legal problems; clarifying
communications with patients; compensation for personal injuries; professional liability;
patient rights; rights and duties concerning emergency medical care; regulation of the
medical profession; cooperation with law enforcement agencies; rights of the dying patient; and confidentiality and privacy. Special medico-legal sessions could be designed
and added for specialty groups, such as transplant surgeons and ancillary laboratory
staff. In addition, office personnel could offer periodic seminars on medico-legal issues,
as well as initiate the publication of a bi-weekly newsletter outlining significant developments in the law and demonstrating specific problems and solutions encountered by the
medico-legal office. A patient education program could be accomplished by having representatives of the medico-legal office attend meetings of community groups, offering
seminars to the community which would familiarize it with the existence and functions
of the office, as well as providing information concerning patients' rights and responsibilities under the law.
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co-legal office is to make the system both more responsive to patients
and to simultaneously decrease the number of malpractice suits.
V.

CONCLUSION

Catastrophic health insurance or credit-subsidy proposals will not
have much impact on the manner in which health care is currently delivered. However, a system of comprehensive health insurance, available to all, will. Under such a plan the current tort system should be
retained as the primary method for quality control, and deductibles
added to the insurance policies both to increase incentives for care and
to decrease premiums. Alternative methods might, however, be devised to provide more universal coverage at a more reasonable cost.
It might also be advisable to limit the role of malpractice litigation to
questions of incompetence and negligence, and assign the compensation function to another mechanism.
In addition, even though the tort system aids in making the health
care system more responsive to patient demands, hospitalized patients
are unlikely to be able to exercise the legal rights necessary to fully
participate in medical decisions regarding their health care. In such
cases patient satisfaction can be enhanced, and the incidence of medical malpractice reduced, by the introduction of an effective patient
grievance mechanism in every major health care institution. It would
be most appropriate for such an office to be independent of the
health care institution, and inclusion of it in a program of national
health insurance seems best.
While there are major problems with the present tort liability
system, they are not those commonly ascribed to it by the medical profession. The system should be judged strictly on the basis of cost-effectiveness, quality control, medical coverage, and responsiveness to consumer desires. When evaluated under these criteria, the tort system,
with the modifications suggested in this Article, retains an important
function in any system of national health insurance. We thus conclude
that it is more essential than expendable.

